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Abstract. Cyber-Physical-Systems (CPS) are systems of collaborating computational 
entities. Concepts such as autonomous cars, smart electric grid, implanted medical de-
vices and smart manufacturing are some practical examples of CPS. However, the open 
and cooperative nature of CPS poses a significant new challenge in assuring dependa-
bility. The DEIS project addresses this important and unsolved challenge by developing 
technologies that facilitate the efficient synthesis of components and systems based on 
their dependability information. The key innovation that is the aim of DEIS is the cor-
responding concept of a Digital Dependability Identity (DDI). A DDI contains all the 
information that uniquely describes the dependability characteristics of a CPS or CPS 
component. DDIs are synthesised at development time and are the basis for the (semi-
)automated integration of components into systems during development, as well as for 
the fully automated dynamic integration of systems into systems of systems in the field. 
In this paper we present an overview of the DDI. Additionally, we provide metrics for 
evaluating the DDI’s impact on CPS dependability, and the results of an evaluation of 
the DDI’s impact on dependability in four CPS industrial systems. These results 
demonstrate the positive impact of the DDI on the dependability of CPS. 
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1 Introduction  
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) harbor the potential for vast economic and soci-
etal impact in domains such as mobility, home automation and delivery of health. 
At the same time, if such systems fail they may harm people and lead to temporary 
collapse of important infrastructures with catastrophic results for industry and 
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society. There are two core challenges while assessing the dependability of a CPS. 
First, the inherent complexity of modern CPS and the resulting complex market 
organisation requiring the tight cooperation between different teams, expertise, 
and institutions, while managing confidentiality issues. The second challenge is 
related to the increase of connectivity, e.g., through machine to machine coopera-
tion enabled by Internet of Things, which introduces a new dynamic in system op-
eration. As a result, Cyber-Physical Systems of Systems (CPSoS) come together as 
temporary configurations of CPS, and which dissolve and give place to other con-
figurations. This leads to a potentially infinite number of variants, with coopera-
tion between systems potentially not analysed during design time.  
The DEIS project1 addresses these important and unsolved challenges by devel-
oping technologies that form a science of dependable system integration. In the 
core of these technologies lies the concept of a Digital Dependability Identity 
(DDI2) of a component or system. The DDI targets (1) improving the efficiency of 
generating consistent dependability argumentation over the supply chain during 
design time, and (2) laying the foundation for runtime certification of ad-hoc net-
works of embedded-systems. During the DEIS project, four industrial systems are 
provided to evaluate the performances of the DDI. The target is to evaluate the 
impact of the proposed methodology for process improvement during product de-
velopment, and to support the emergence of new functions, e.g., supported by 
higher degree of collaboration. The core challenge for the evaluation of the project 
relies on the two levels of innovation: first the dependability engineering ap-
proach shall be enhanced, second this shall be deployed to improve the industrial 
product with new solutions.  
Assuring dependability of CPS is the core challenge of the DEIS project. Depend-
ability has been qualitatively defined as ‘the ability to deliver service that can justi-
fiably be trusted’, and quantitatively defined as ‘the ability to avoid service failures 
that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable to its user(s)’ [1]. De-
pendability encompasses the following attributes: availability; reliability; safety; 
confidentiality; integrity; maintainability.  The security attribute is considered a 
triage of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. These ‘primary’ attributes may 
contain ‘secondary’ attributes, for example accountability, authenticity, and non-
repudiability can be considered secondary attributes of security [1]. 
Contribution of this paper is to present a systematic approach for the evalua-
tion of dependability methodologies for CPS, and to apply this method for the eval-
uation of the DDIs in the four industrial systems of the DEIS project. The paper is 
organized as follow: Section 2 presents related works on quality assessment. An over-
view of the DDI is presented in Section 3, and the research methodology as well as the 
systems are introduced in Section 4. In Section 5, the tailoring of the standards used for 
                                                          
1 Dependability Engineering Innovation for automotive CPS. This project has received funding 
from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant 
agreement No 732242, see www.deis-project.eu  
2 Schneider, D., Trapp, M., Papadopoulos, Y., Armengaud, E., Zeller, M., & Höfig, K. (2015). 
WAP: Digital dependability identities. 26th International Symposium on Software Reliability 
Engineering (ISSRE'15), (pp. 324-329) 
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evaluation are presented, and in Section 6 the evaluation results are provided. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes this work.  
 
 
2 Related Work  
A software quality model can be defined as ‘a model that describes, assesses and/or 
predicts quality’[2], or as ‘a set of factors, criteria and metrics (characteristics) and the 
relationship between them. These relations provide the basis for specifying quality re-
quirements and evaluating quality’ [3]. 
Several models of software quality factors and their categorisation have been sug-
gested over the years. The first software quality models were published in the mid 
1970’s by Boehm et al. [4] and Mc Call et al. [5]. Mc Call identified three main per-
spectives for characterising the quality attributes of a software product i.e. a product’s 
ability to change, adaptability to new environments, and basic operational characteris-
tics. From these three perspectives Mc Call identified eleven characteristics. The major 
contribution of the McCall method was to considerer relationships between quality 
characteristics and metrics. This model was used as a base for the creation of others 
quality models [6]. The main drawback of the Mc Call model is the accuracy in the 
measurement of quality, as it is based on responses of Yes or No. Furthermore, the 
model does not consider the functionality so that the user's vision is diminished [7]. 
Boehm’s model [4] constitutes an improvement on Mc Call’s model because it is based 
on a wider range of characteristics and because it adds factors at different levels. 
The FURPS quality model [8], which was proposed by Robert Grady from Hewlett 
Packard in 1992, takes into account the following five characteristics: Functionality, 
Usability, Reliability, Performance, and Supportability. A main drawback of this model 
is that it does not consider some important characteristics such as portability, which 
may be an important criterion for application development [9]. In 1995 Robert Dromey 
proposed a product based quality model [10] based on the idea that a more dynamic 
way of modelling process was needed. This was due to the fact that quality evaluation 
differs between products and the model needed to be wide enough to apply to different 
systems.  
In order to standardise quality assessment, the International Organisation for Stand-
ardisation developed ISO 9126 [11] in 1991 and revised it in 2001 [12]. This standard 
is an extension of previous models as defined above, and is divided into four parts 
which address the following subjects: quality model; external metrics; internal metrics; 
and quality in use metrics. The quality model is divided into the following six charac-
teristics: Functionality; Reliability; Usability; Efficiency; Maintainability; and   Porta-
bility. The internal metrics are static metrics that do not rely on software execution, 
whereas the external metrics rely on running software. Quality in use metrics can be 
measured only when the final product is used in a real environment with real conditions. 
The ISO 9126 model was updated in 2005 and evolved to become part of the ISO 
25000:2005 [13] series, and which has further been revised with ISO 25000: 2011[14]. 
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Studies conducted by [15-17] indicate that the ISO/IEC 25010 [18] model is the most 
comprehensive quality model available because it covers the most quality characteris-
tics and sub-characteristics. It achieves this by adding new characteristics such as secu-
rity and compatibility. 
3 Overview of DDI  
Assurance cases represent the backbone of modern dependability assurance processes, 
because they record the dependability requirements to be fulfilled by a system (of sys-
tem) in an intended operational environment together with the evidences that support 
the requirement’s validity in the finally implemented system. All produced dependabil-
ity-engineering artifacts using such evidence are motivated by an uncertainty about 
whether a dependability claim about the system is actually fulfilled. 
Since there is an interrelation between the system, it’s dependability claims, and the 
supporting evidence artifacts that exist in the real world, we claim this should also be 
the case for the system’s model-based safety reflection, i.e. its DDI (see Fig. 1). DDIs 
represent an integrated set of dependability data models that may be (semi-)automati-
cally analysed, generated or manipulated during the execution of safety engineering 
processes.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Open Dependability Exchange Metamodel (ODE) 
A DDI contains information that uniquely describes all dependability characteristics of 
a system required for certifying the system’s dependability. DDIs are formed as modu-
lar assurance cases and their composability allows for the (semi-)automatically synthe-
sizing of system DDIs from the DDIs of the subcomponents. The DDI of a system 
contains a) claims about the dependability guarantees given by a system to other sys-
tems and derived system dependability requirements and b) supporting evidence for 
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those claims in the form of various models and analyses. For security assurance, it con-
tains e.g. threat and risk analyses (TARA) and attack trees, while for safety assurance, 
hazard and risk analyses (HARA), architecture modeling and failure propagation mod-
eling such as fault trees, FMEA or Markov chains are supported.  
Due to the integration and standardisation of these models in the Open Dependability 
Exchange Metamodel (ODE), a self-contained system dependability package can sup-
port many dependability-engineering activities of the system lifecycle. 
4 Research Methodology 
Section 4.1 provides an overview of the methodology employed to select the quality 
metrics used to evaluate the impact of the DDI, while section 4.2 provides a brief de-
scription of the four systems used for this same evaluation. 
4.1 Methodology  
The methodology used to conduct this research comprised the following main stages: 
Select metrics; Select systems; Evaluate DDI impact in systems; and Report findings. 
As stated in section 2, the ISO 25010 quality model is the most comprehensive qual-
ity model available and so this model, and specifically metrics from the following 
standards within the ISO 25000 series were selected to assess the impact of the DDI: 
ISO 25022 [19]; ISO 25023 [20]; and ISO 25024 [21]. Details of the metrics and their 
selection are provided in section 5. 
Four industrial partners on the DEIS project each put forward a system for assessing 
the impact of the DDI. Two systems are embedded in the automotive domain while one 
each are embedded in the railway and healthcare domains. A short description of these 
systems is provided in section 4.2. For each system a team of people from within each 
system’s organisation conducted the evaluation. Each system was evaluated both before 
and after application of the DDI. The make-up of the teams was decided upon by the 
organisation themselves, so for example the Siemens team included 1 model-based 
safety and reliability engineer, 1 model-based safety and reliability consultant, 1 safety 
engineer, and 1 reliability engineer.  Through expert judgement and consensus, and 
with the use of the measurement formulae within the standards, each team determined 
values for the selected characteristics. An example of how one organisation arrived at 
a value for the ‘functional suitability’ quality characteristic is provided in Table 2 in 
section 5. The results for each organisation’s quality characteristic assessment are pro-
vided in section 6. 
4.2 Systems 
Portable Medical Technology (PMT): ONCOassist, PMT’s mobile decision sup-
port application for oncology professionals will evaluate DDI in the integration be-
tween ONCOasist and hospital systems electronic health records. The system will show 
the security and data validity as it transfers patient data between systems. Oncology 
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professionals will pass patients’ data to ONCOassist to preform calculations that would 
not be possible on the hospital system. The integration will save time and increase ac-
curacy significantly.  
 
General Motors (GM): The Dependable Physiological Monitor System (DPMS) 
use case describes the sensing environment inside the vehicle that monitors the health 
condition of drivers and passengers. The DPMS aids prevention of accidents in cases 
where the occupant’s health condition deteriorates. The DPMS will apply the DDI at 
both development time and at runtime. During the development phase a reduction of 
time-to-market is expected as a consequence of the usage of DDI methodology. At 
runtime, DDI is evaluated against the overall dependability of this system, dealing with 
security and privacy aspects in V2V and V2C communication. 
Siemens (SAG): The Siemens system is a European Train Control System (ETCS). 
For this project the focus is on the on-board unit instead of on the track-side unit. Con-
cretely this system will be used for proving and illustrating strengths and drawbacks of 
DDI in several engineering phases, such as architecture, qualitative and quantitative 
dependability analysis, and Goal Structural Notation (GSN) based dependability assur-
ance case development.  
AVL: Heavy-duty trucks create a platoon to reduce time gaps between the trucks, to 
increase energy efficiency, improve safety, and to reduce truck driver loads. In the SAE 
L4 platoon function, platoon level decisions are taken by the platoon leader and broad-
casted to the follower vehicles and executed by each member without any need of a 
human driver or operator in a constrained operation boundary. Two-way information 
flow between vehicles and different communication topologies between members cre-
ates a wide range of dependability.  
5 Metric Selection  
The quality characteristics, and the metrics for these characteristics, were selected from 
the following standards: ISO 25022; ISO 25023; and ISO 25024. ISO 25022 defines 
characteristics and measures for evaluating quality in use characteristics i.e. quality 
from the end user’s perspective, ISO 25023 defines characteristics and measures for 
quantitatively evaluating system and software product quality characteristics, while 
ISO 25024 defines data quality characteristics and measures for quantitatively evaluat-
ing the quality of the data within the systen. 
These standards contained more quality characteristics than was relevant for meas-
uring the impact of the DDI, therefore the first task was to decide which characteristics 
were relevant. A focus group, containing members from the DEIS project partners, was 
formed to conduct this task. The members of this focus group are listed as authors of 
this paper. The process of selecting the relevant metrics included five 1.5 to 2 hour on-
line meetings. At these meetings, each metric within the three standards was discussed 
in detail with two main considerations in mind: 1) its relevance to assessing the impact 
of the DDI; and 2) practicality for each partner to make the measurement (by practical-
ity we mean that the industrial partners considered making all measurements within the 
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standards to be an onerous task, especially considering that some of the measurements 
are optional). Decisions on whether to include a metric, or not, were based on a general 
consensus which was largely unanimous in each case. The number of characteristics 
and measures within each standard, along with the number of characteristics and 
measures selected from each of the standards, is displayed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Number of characteristics and measures within standards versus number of characteris-
tics and measures selected for measuring DDI impact 
Number of characteristics and 
measures within standards 
Selected for measuring impact of 
DDI 
Standard Characteristics Measures Characteristics Measures 
ISO 
25022 
5 36 4 10 
ISO 
25023 
8 86 7 29 
ISO 
25024 
15 63 10 19 
 28 185 21 58 
 
In total, the team selected 21 quality characteristics (from 28 within the standards). 
From these 21 characteristics, 42 sub-characteristics were selected as shown in section 
6 below. A total of 58 separate measures (from 185 within the standards) were em-
ployed in order to determine values for the quality characteristics.  
6 Evaluation Results  
The results from evaluating the DDI in the four industrial systems are now presented in 
the following three subsections. 
6.1 ISO 25022 Quality in Use Results 
Table 3 presents the results from evaluating the four ‘Quality in Use’ characteristics 
which have been selected from ISO 25022. The selected sub-characteristics (three in 
total) are listed in column 2. The ‘Effectiveness’ and ‘Efficiency’ characteristics have 
no sub-characteristics. The results for each system is presented in 2 columns with the 
first column presenting the result without the DDI applied, and the second column (in 
italics) presenting the result with the DDI applied. Each individual result can vary from 
0 to 1, with 1 being equivalent in percentage terms to 100. The last column in the table 
presents the average improvement, in percentage terms, across the four systems, so for 
example ‘Effectiveness’ increased by an average of 14.2% when DDI was applied. 
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Table 2. 'Quality in Use' characteristic values across four systems 
Characteristic 
(4) 
Sub characteristic 
(3) 
GM GM AVL AVL PMT PMT SAG SAG AVG
% 
imp. 
Effectiveness n/a 0.390.56 0.5 0.63 0.5 0.58 0.64 0.83 14.2 
Efficiency n/a 0.440.62 0.25 0.44 0.53 0.82 0.05 0.95 39.0 
Freedom from 
Risk 
Economic risk miti-
gation 
0.610.73 0.65 0.85 0.33 0.68 0.73 0.87 20.3 
Context Cov-
erage 
Context complete-
ness, and Flexibil-
ity measures 
0.2 0.2 0.42 0.67 0.5 1.0 0.35 0.69 27.3 
 
The last column above indicates that the application of the DDI resulted in signifi-
cant improvement in each of the ‘Quality in Use’ metrics. The ‘Efficiency’ metric, at 
39% improvement, is particularly influenced by the SAG results who state that ‘We are 
expecting a significant increase of the number of the objectives achieved for the same 
period of time by introducing DDI. Furthermore, we are expecting a significant de-
crease in the cost for carrying out the task for the same amount of objects in ETCS use 
case’. 
Another interesting observation from Table 3 is the GM result for ‘Context Cover-
age’. Context coverage assesses the degree to which a product or system can be used 
with effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction, and freedom from risk in both specified con-
texts of use and in contexts beyond those initially explicitly identified. GM results in-
dicate no improvement as ‘no other scenario has been evaluated for DPMS usage’. 
6.2 ISO 25023 System and Software Quality Results 
Table 4 presents the results from evaluating the seven ‘System and Software Quality’ 
characteristics which have been selected from ISO 25023, and is structured the same as 
Table 3. The seven characteristics contain twenty sub-characteristics. 
While all characteristics indicate an average improvement across the four systems, 
‘Performance efficiency’ is the lowest at 4.5%. This is due to most of the systems re-
porting a very small improvement in this characteristic, with Siemens reporting practi-
cally no improvement due to such factors as: ‘Resource utilization: for mean processor 
utilisation and bandwidth utilisation, we could not observe any improvement by use of 
DDI. Both mean processor utilisation and bandwidth utilisation remain low for railway 
safety-critical system’ 
Table 3. System and Software characteristics across four systems 
Characteristic Sub characteristics GM GM AVL AVL PMT PMT SAG SAG AVG
% 
imp 
Functional suit-
ability 
Functional complete-
ness,and correctness 
0.65 0.7 0.55 0.65 0.67 0.83 0.99 0.99 7.8 
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The ‘Portability’ characteristic, which assesses the degree of effectiveness and effi-
ciency with which a system, product or component can be transferred from one hard-
ware, software or other operational or usage environment to another,  indicated no im-
provement across three systems (GM, AVL, and SAG). This was mainly due to factors 
such as no portability is conducted in the system: GM stated ‘No improvement here, 
considering that no other scenario has been evaluated outside the GM architecture 
ecosystem’, while AVL stated ‘No portability related implementation has been done’. 
For SAG the reason was somewhat different in that they reported that ‘the DDI does 
not offer additional data or handling in case of porting the ETCS system onto another 
environment’. 
For the ‘Security’ characteristic, which assess the degree to which a system protects 
data so that persons or other systems have the degree of data access appropriate to their 
types and levels of authorization, two systems reported a score of zero for the security 
sub-characteristics listed in Table 4, however with application of the DDI their security 
score improved to 0.2. Both of the systems reported an improvement due to implemen-
tation of authentication rules. 
For ‘Functional suitability’ SAG reported no improvement due to the fact that they 
consider their system to be practically functionally complete and correct. They stated 
that their ETCS products have 1% of missing intended usage of the system without DDI 
(99% of usage completeness)…….This estimation is also true for the correctness of 
functions’. 
While the majority of the selected system and software quality metrics are applicable 
to most of the systems, according to the industry partners there are occasions where 
some metrics may not apply to some systems. For example the ‘portability’ metric only 
showed improvement in the PMT system. 
 
Performance 
efficiency 
Time behavior, and Re-
source utilisation 
0.46 0.51 0.39 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.39 0.4 4.5 
Compatability Co-existance, and In-
teroperability 
0.5 0.5 0.71 0.83 0.43 0.73 0.79 0.83 11.5 
Reliability Maturity, Availability, 
and Fault tolerance 
0.71 0.77 0.66 0.78 0.66 0.70 0.75 0.63 7.0 
Security Confidentiality, Integ-
rity, Authenticity, Ac-
countability, and Non-
repudiation 
0.6 0.68 0 0.2 0.2 0.38 0 0.2 16.5 
Maintainability Reusability, Analysabil-
ity, Modifiability, Testa-
bility 
0.45 0.52 0.39 0.6 0.44 0.78 0.51 0.55 16.5 
Portability Adaptability, Replacea-
bility 
0.3 0.3 0 0 0.33 0.83 0 0 12.5 
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6.3 ISO 25024 Data Quality Results 
Table 5 presents the results from evaluating the ten ‘Data Quality’ characteristics which 
have been selected from ISO 25024, and is structured the same as Table 3. The ten 
characteristics contain nineteen sub-characteristics. 
Table 4. Data quality characteristics across four systems 
Characteristic Sub characteristics GM GM AVL AVL PMT PMT SAG SAG AVG
% 
imp 
Data accuracy Syntactic accuracy 0.6 0.68 0.5 0.63 0.5 0.63 0.88 1 11.5 
Completeness Record, and Attrib-
ute completeness 
0.55 0.61 0.38 0.63 0.25 0.88 1 1 23.5 
Consistency Data format and Ar-
chitecture con-
sistency, and Risk of 
data inconsistency 
0.38 0.48 0.33 0.58 0.33 0.53 0.61 0.66 15.0 
Credibility Values, Source, and 
Data model credibil-
ity 
0.6 0.64 0.5 0.67 0.47 0.87 1 1 15.3 
Compliance Regulatory compli-
ance of value, and 
Technology 
0.54 0.65 0.44 0.75 0.3 0.8 1 1 23.0 
Confidentiality Encryption, and 
Non-vulnerability 
0.66 0.66 0.38 0.63 0.55 0.71 0 0 10.3 
Precision Data values, and For-
mat precision 
0.48 0.51 0.38 0.63 0.6 0.8 1 1 12.0 
Traceability Traceability of data 
values, Data value 
Traceability 
0.5 0.64 0.38 0.5 0.19 0.75 0.7 0.95 26.8 
Understanda-
bility 
Semantic undstanda-
bility 
0.55 0.68 0.25 0.63 0.6 0.8 0 0 17.8 
Portability Data portability ratio 0.48 0.63 0.38 0.63 0.4 0.8 0 0 20.0 
 
Table 5 indicates that all the selected data quality characteristics show an average 
improvement across the 4 systems, ranging from 10.3% to 26.8%. However for one 
system, seven of the characteristics show no improvement. For the data completeness, 
data credibility, data precision and data compliance, SAG state that their ETCS system 
has to be certified according to relevant safety standards and that these values are at 
100% regardless of whether the DDI is applied or not. For data confidentiality, SAG 
state that this metric is not applicable but give no reason for this. With regards to data 
understandability SAG report no improvement, stating that ‘the semantic understanda-
bility will not be changed by introducing DDI’, and for data portability SAG state that 
‘the DDI does not influence the portability in the sense of operation environment adapt-
ability and data reusability/import capability’. The fact that three of the metrics have 
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scored zero with and without DDI implementation clearly indicates that SAG do not 
think that these metrics can be improved in their system. 
For GM, the data confidentiality metric indicated no improvement. The reason for 
this according to GM is that applying the DDI guarantees the same level of data confi-
dentiality as against not applying the DDI. However GM further state that the DDI can 
help in selecting at design time the best security solution to satisfy confidentiality re-
quirements. 
While the majority of the selected data quality metrics are applicable to most of the 
use cases, there were occasions where some metrics may not apply to some systems. 
7 Conclusion  
The selected metrics for measuring the impact of the DDI were chosen because of their 
relevance to assessing the impact of the DDI, and their practicality for each partner to 
make the measurement. The results of the evaluation indicate that applying the DDI has 
made significant improvements in the quality of each system, from an end user and 
from a system and data perspective. The results show that in all cases applying the DDI 
has made an average improvement for all metrics, with the smallest improvement being 
4.5% for Software and System Performance efficiency, and the largest improvement 
being 39% for the quality in use ‘Efficiency’ metric. These results demonstrate the pos-
itive impact of the DDI on the dependability of CPS. 
However, the results of the evaluation also indicate that not all metrics may apply to all 
systems, and that not all metrics showed an improvement in all systems, for example 
the Systems and Software Quality metric ‘Portability’ only showed improvement in one 
of the four systems. While all metrics were applied, the industry partners indicated that 
in some instances a relatively small number of the metrics did not apply to their system. 
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